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PLURALISM AND MODERNITY
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM*
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay considers the claim that liberalism offers an impoverished
and narrow vision of human association. One of the classic statements of
this claim is found in the early Marx. He wrote that the freedom pro-
vided by liberalism "is that of a man treated as an isolated monad and
withdrawn into himself."' This conception of freedom, he continued, "is
not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man
from man. ' ' 2 Marx's critique is echoed in contemporary political philos-
ophy. Alasdair MacIntyre writes that "Modem politics is civil war car-
ried on by other means."'3 Michael Sandel suggests that the alternative to
the liberal regime is strong community, a form of social arrangement that
is "constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants."'4
These critics of liberalism share a picture of the liberal regime as a social
order that favors a particular conception of the human good: an atomis-
tic, individualistic conception that destroys the social basis for commu-
nity and solidarity.5
Ronald Beiner, in his paper, The Liberal Regime,6 has developed the
critique of liberal political theory from a neo-Aristotelian perspective. 7
He offers a powerful elaboration of the claim that liberalism produces an
impoverished ethos or way of life and a strong defense of an Aristotelian
alternative. I agree with much in this critique. Certainly, Aristotle's
moral and political theory offers insights into contemporary debates in
constitutional theory and jurisprudence," but there are two aspects of
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount
University, Los Angeles, California. I owe thanks to Ron Beiner, Shelley Marks, and Sam Pillsbury
for their remarks on earlier versions of this essay.
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5. See Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1087 (1990).
6. Beiner, The Liberal Regime, 66 CHi. KENT L. REV. 73 (1990).
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Beiner's paper with which I will take issue. First, I disagree with the
claim that Aristotle's moral and political theory is consistent with the
fact of pluralism. Second, I take issue with the charge that liberalism is
defective because it entails an impoverished ethos. Before exploring these
points of contention, let me introduce the concepts that are fundamental
to the debate.
Beiner develops his critique of liberalism in the context of an exposi-
tion of Aristotle's political and ethical theory. Four of Aristotle's
ideas-virtue, eudaimonia, ethos, and politeia-are fundamental to my
discussion of Beiner's paper. My exploration of Beiner's argument relies
on the following formulations of these concepts. The first idea is Aris-
totle's notion of virtue. The virtues are qualities of intellect and charac-
ter, such as prudence, courage, and wisdom, that are conducive to
human flourishing.9 In particular, Beiner endorses the doctrine of the
unity of the virtues-the thesis that one must possess all of the virtues in
order truly to flourish.' 0 The second Aristotelian concept is eudaimonia,
or "the happy life."'" Beiner defends Aristotle's claim that eudaimonia
is the telos or proper end of human life, and rejects the claim that Aris-
totle's account of eudaimonia is inconsistent with moral disagreement,
which he equates with pluralism.' 2 The third Aristotelian notion is that
"moral life is based upon ethos: that is, character formation according to
socially-bred customs and habit."'13 Beiner deploys the notion of ethos as
a building block for his critique of liberalism. The fourth and final Aris-
totelian idea is politeia, usually translated as constitution. Beiner follows
Leo Strauss,' 4 using "regime" rather than "constitution" as the transla-
tion for politeia. This translation, Beiner contends, highlights the notion
that political action entails implicit claims to truth, to the moral right-
ness of certain exemplary ways of life.' 5 For Beiner, "[t]he liberal regime
is a regime of producers and consumers, not a regime of citizens.' 6
II. ARISTOTLE AND PLURALISM
Let me return to my first disagreement with Beiner. Is Aristotle's
nan, Virtue Ethics in a Perfectionist Theory of Law and Justice, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 335, 339
(1989).
9. See Beiner, supra note 6, at 73-75.
10. See id. at 78-79.
11. Id. at 75, 78.
12. See id. at 81-82.
13. Id. at 83.
14. See L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 136-38 (1953).
15. See Beiner, supra note 6, at 86.
16. Id. at 89.
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moral and political theory consistent with the fact of pluralism? Beiner
answers in the affirmative-my answer is a qualified no. My reasons are
advanced in two stages. Initially, I explore what is meant by "the fact of
pluralism," and consider objections to it. The second stage is a consider-
ation of the implications of the fact of pluralism for Aristotle's concep-
tion of the good as happiness or eudaimonia.
A. The Fact of Pluralism
By the fact of pluralism, I mean that modem societies are character-
ized by deep and intractable differences about the nature of the good. 17
These differences, historically rooted in the religious disagreements that
gave rise to the religious wars of the sixteenth century,18 are about what
it fundamentally means to live a good life. The American constitutional
order encompasses orthodox Jews, fundamentalist Christians, and secu-
lar humanists. These diverse groups could not be brought to reach agree-
ment about the nature of the good life without the intolerable use of
coercive state power. 19 The contrary position, positing a modem society
with a cohesive ethos that binds us together through common bonds of
culture and tradition, is a romantic notion. 20 The romantic ideal of com-
munal solidarity and unity of social purpose is unrealistic, given deep
disagreements about the nature of the good that have persisted for
centuries.
Before proceeding to consider Beiner's advocacy of an Aristotelian
conception of the good, I pause to note that the fact of pluralism is con-
troversial. Although Beiner does not directly attack the argument for
the fact of pluralism, others have done so. For example, Stephen
Gardbaum has recently argued that the liberal argument for neutrality
relies on unproven premises. 21 He restates the fact of pluralism argu-
ment as follows:
The fact of pluralism argument for strong neutrality holds that,
17. Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. OF L. STUDIES 4 (1987).
18. See Holmes, Jean Bodin. The Paradox of Sovereignty and Privatization of Religion, in RELI-
GION, MORALrrY, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXX 5 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1988); Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & Pun. An. 225 (1985).
19. Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 17, at 4.
20. See Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POLrICAL THEORY 339, 343-44 (1990) ("Romantic
thinkers from Herder to MacIntyre have stressed... the values of belonging and custom.").
21. See Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARv. L.
REv. 1350, 1364-70 (1991). Gardbaum discusses Charles Larmore and Ronald Dworkin in addition
to Rawls. See id. at 1365 n.51. My discussion will focus on Rawls' version of the argument.
Gardbaum's criticism is voiced from the perspective of a comprehensive liberal. That is,
Gardbaum advances liberalism as a conception of the good life and not only as a political conception
of justice. However, Gardbaum's points could be advanced by a nonliberal critic of Raws, e.g., a
communitarian or an advocate of a religious state.
1990]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
given the fact of pluralism ... , only two options are available to the
state: either neutrality among the conflicting ideals, or coercive imposi-
tion on those who do not share the one or ones promoted. And, given
this choice, a liberal state must opt for neutrality.22
Thus, Gardbaum's version of the fact of pluralism argument assumes
that the modem state is faced with a dilemma: either intolerable coer-
cion or neutrality with respect to comprehensive conceptions of the good.
Call this the coercion or neutrality dilemma.
Gardbaum argues that the coercion or neutrality dilemma is a false
one for two reasons. First, the state can promote conceptions of the good
in noncoercive ways, for example through tax breaks, financial aid or
education. 23 Second, the conclusion of the fact of pluralism argument-
that state coercion is unacceptable-is unwarranted. Gardbaum bases
this second reason on two further considerations: (a) coercive state ac-
tion is accepted as justified in a variety of contexts, e.g., criminal prohibi-
tions against theft, murder, etc., and (b) the advocates of the fact of
pluralism argument have not provided a reason for rejecting coercion to
gain general agreement on a conception of the good, while accepting it in
other contexts. 24
If Gardbaum's characterization of the fact of pluralism argument
were accurate, then his criticism would be a telling one. But the argu-
ment that Gardbaum refutes is not the one that Rawls advanced. 25 Four
points of clarification are required in order to reconstruct the fact of plu-
ralism argument.
The first clarification is this: Rawls' argument is not that coercion is
the only means by which the state could promote particular comprehen-
sive conceptions of the good. Rather, his contention was that unaccept-
able levels of coercion are the only means for reaching society-wide
agreement on a particular moral or religious conception.26 This abstract
point becomes clear through illustration. If the fact of pluralism claim is
correct, then it would require intolerable levels of state coercion to pro-
duce agreement in the United States on fundamentalist Christianity or
Millian liberalism, as the single, correct conception of the good. On
22. Id. at 1364.
23. See id. at 1367.
24. See id. at 1367-68.
25. I believe that it is very clear that Rawls does not make the claim that Gardbaum attributes
to him. But even if I am wrong about this, the discussion that follows is important, because the
arguments that I advanced would be available to political liberals, even if Rawls had not already
made them.
26. See Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U.L. REv. 233,
235 (1989) ("[O]nly the oppressive use of state power can maintain a common affirmation of one
comprehensive, religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine.").
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Gardbaum's interpretation, Rawls would have made a much stronger
claim-that it would be impossible for a government to promote a partic-
ular comprehensive moral or religious conception, such as Catholicism
or consumerist materialism, by noncoercive tax breaks or promotion in
the public schools. That claim is clearly false,27 but it is a much stronger
claim than the one that Rawls actually advanced. The lesson of the first
clarification is that the fact of pluralism argument does not assume the
coercion or neutrality dilemma.
The second clarification is an elaboration of the fact of pluralism
argument: pluralism will persist absent intolerable state coercion because
of a variety of factors that make it extraordinarily difficult, even for rea-
-sonable people, to reach agreement on a comprehensive conception of the
good. Rawls refers to these factors as the "burdens of reason."'28 The
factors include the difficulty of assessing, evaluating, and weighing com-
plex evidence, the presence of hard cases to which our moral concepts
have indeterminate application, and value conflicts that cannot be elimi-
nated or reduced to a single metric. To my mind, the most fundamental
source of disagreement is expressed by Rawls as follows:
To some unknown extent, our total experience, our whole course of life
up to now, shapes the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and
political values, and our total experiences surely differ. Thus, in a
modem society with its numerous offices and positions, its various divi-
sions of labor, its many social groups and often their ethnic variety, the
total experiences of citizens are disparate enough for their judgments
to diverge, at least to some degree, on many if not most cases of suffi-
cient complexity. 29
The burdens of reason explain why noncoercive measures are unlikely to
produce agreement on a single comprehensive religious or moral concep-
tion of the good.
To Rawls' exposition, I add the following point.30 The existence of
a variety of comprehensive moral and political conceptions reinforces the
divergence of total experiences. One's comprehensive moral or religious
view shapes the way that one assesses evidence and weighs values. Par-
ticipation in a religious or moral tradition is sometimes participation in a
form of life, and the distinctive language games in different forms of life
may vary in what they count as evidence, as a good argument, and so
27. Indeed, because the claim that Gardbaum attributes to Rawls is so clearly false, the princi-
ple of charity in interpretation should make us leery of casually accepting the claim that this claim is
what Rawls intended.
28. Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, supra note 26, at 235-38.
29. See id. at 237.
30. Rawls does not make the argument that follows, and it could be that he would view it as
inconsistent with his approach to the burdens of reason.
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forth.31 Thus, fundamentalist Christians and secular humanists have
very different starting points; they have divergent systems of reference.
They would not leave these differences behind if they sought to reason
together about the nature of the good life. Given the burdens of reason,
it would be difficult, even for citizens with similar life histories, to reach
complete agreement about the good. Hence, it is hardly surprising that
modem history confirms the fact of pluralism: a society composed of
citizens with different religious or moral conceptions of the good will not
reach voluntary agreement on a single conception. 32
The third point of clarification focuses on the reasons for the claim
that the coercion required to produce consensus on the good would be
intolerable. Rawls claims that the level of state coercion required to pro-
duce agreement about agreement on a single conception of the good
would be intolerable. The reason is not that all coercion is intolerable.
Indeed, state coercion to enforce rules against certain crimes is not only
tolerable, it is required by corrective justice. Rather, the reason is that an
enormous and oppressive amount of coercion would be required to force
agreement on a single comprehensive religious or moral conception of
the good. This is a lesson of history. People will fight and die for the
liberty of conscience. Gaining consensus on any comprehensive concep-
tion, be it fundamentalist Christianity or secular humanism, would re-
quire a totalitarian state. In such a state, liberty of speech and thought
would perish. This price is too high, even if what could be bought would
31. Cf L. WI-rGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 64e (P. Winch ed. 1980) ("It strikes me that
a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference.
Hence, although it's belief, it's really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It's passionately
seizing hold of this interpretation.").
32. At this point, Gardbaum might offer the following query: if modem societies cannot reach
agreement on a conception of the good, how will they reach a stable agreement on a conception of
justice? Surely, there are deep persistent disagreements about justice, just as there are about the
good.
Briefly, there are two reasons to believe that agreement on a conception of justice is possible.
First, although we (the citizens of modem, democratic societies) do not share a single conception of
the good, we do share a public political culture. This culture contains ideas, such as toleration,
liberty of conscience, equality, and respect for personhood, from which one can reason to a concep-
tion of justice. When it comes to political justice, we have much more in the way of common
tradition and heritage than we do when it comes to the nature of the good life.
Second, there are reasons to believe that it may be possible to form an overlapping consensus,
between different comprehensive moral and religious perspectives, on the subject of justice. Of
course, the reasons for affirming a liberal conception of justice may vary. When Christians give
justifications to other Christians, the reasons may differ from those that Jews give to other Jews. Cf.
Weithman, Basic Ideas and Moral Ideas: The Political Justification of Justice as Fairness (unpub-
lished manuscript 1990) (on file with the author) ("Catholic theologians could argue that Rawls's
two principles guarantee that each individual will have the social bases of the dignity to which she is
entitled as a creature made in God's image and likeness."); Beckley, A Christian Affirmation of
Rawls' Idea of Justice as Fairness--Part I, 13 J. OF RELIGIOUS ETHics 210-11 (1985).
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be a society in consensus on the one conception of the good life that will
produce the greatest human happiness.
The fourth point of clarification concerns the reason that the state
should not promote particular comprehensive conceptions even if the
means are limited to those which are noncoercive or minimally coercive.
Why shouldn't the state use tax breaks, subsidies, or the public schools to
promote particular religious or moral conceptions of the good? The
question gains urgency because the conception to be promoted would be
chosen democratically; we are not considering the possibility of a dicta-
tor promoting her conception against the will of a majority. As an initial
step toward an answer, recall that such noncoercive measures will not
succeed in producing consensus. For example, many citizens would con-
tinue to believe in secular humanism, Judaism, Islam or Buddhism, even
if Christianity were taught in the schools and subsidized by the state.
Noncoercive state promotion of particular comprehensive conceptions
will take place in a society where many will never be persuaded.
There are two reasons for rejecting noncoercive state promotion of a
particular conception of the good given the fact of pluralism. First, such
state action, even if noncoercive, 33 fails to give full and equal respect to
the citizens who reject the majority conception.34 The underlying princi-
ple is that the state should act in a way that can be justified to its citizens.
Citizens are respected when the state acts in ways they can accept as
having reasonable justification.35 But promotion of particular religions
or moral philosophies cannot be justified to all citizens. For example,
state promotion of atheism could not be justified to citizens who are be-
lievers. From the perspective of theist citizens, a state that acts to pro-
mote atheism is treating them as means and not as ends.
Second, putting the promotion of comprehensive conceptions on the
political agenda would threaten the stability of modern democratic socie-
ties. Gardbaum rejects this argument on the ground that it is not sup-
ported by evidence:
[T]here is little reason to believe that the depth of controversy sur-
rounding state promotion of policies in such noncomprehensive moral-
33. What counts as coercion is open to debate. Even subsidies and education have coercive
elements. Unless the subsidy is paid out of a special fund into which payment is voluntary, then
participation in the subsidy is coerced by the criminal penalties that ultimately back up the tax laws.
Similarly, coerced contributions pay for education. Given mandatory attendance laws, participation
in public schooling is also coerced for those who cannot afford to pay for private schooling.
34. Gardbaum notes this argument, but seems to believe that it relies on the coercion or neu-
trality dilemma. See Gardbaum, supra note 21, at 1364-65.
35. This requirement does not mean that every citizen must accept the justifications that are
offered. It does mean that the justifications that are offered must be such that a reasonable citizen
could accept them, given her conception of the good.
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ity areas as war and foreign policy, substantive equality of opportunity,
direct taxation, or the distribution of income and wealth would be sig-
nificantly less threatening to the stability of the political order.36
Of course, Gardbaum is right that conflicts over justice can also threaten
basic stability: slavery is a good example. But modem history does pro-
vide a very good reason to believe that political conflict over comprehen-
sive conceptions, particularly conflict over religion, is more likely to
generate serious instability than other conflict. The past half-millennium
of European history and the reality of contemporary Beirut remind us
that people are willing to fight and to die for their religious faith. Indeed,
Hobbes's contribution to political philosophy was to call our attention to
this, the dark side of the fact of pluralism. 37
Given the fact of pluralism, the question becomes whether the state
endorsement of Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia or happiness would
run afoul of the liberal commitment to respect for citizens or the danger
of political instability.
B. Eudaimonia as a Particular Conception of the Good
How is Aristotle's theory inconsistent with the fact of pluralism?
Let me begin to answer this question by drawing a distinction and intro-
ducing a qualification. The distinction, made by liberal political theory,
is between the right and the good.3 I have been assuming this distinc-
tion, and now I will state it explicitly. A conception of the good is a
conception of what an individual or community should aim for;39 such a
conception will specify both plans of life for individuals and forms of
communal life for groups.40 By way of contrast, a conception of the right
36. Gardbaum, supra note 21, at 1370.
37. See S. Lloyd, Interpreting Hobbes's Leviathan (unpublished thesis, Harvard University
1987) (forthcoming from Cambridge University Press as S. LLOYD, IDEALS AS INTERESTS IN HOB-
BES'S LEVIATHAN: A CASE OF MiND OVER MATTER (1992)).
38. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 31-32, 446-52 (1971); Rawls, The Priority of the
Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251 (1988).
39. Importantly, a conception of the good need not be selfish or materialistic. For example, a
conception of the good might be self-regarding but not materialistic: for some the good life may
consist in contemplation and prayer. On the other hand, a conception of the good might be other-
regarding but materialistic: the good life may consist in works of charity aimed at improving the
material life of others.
40. Thus, liberal political theory does not require individualistic, as opposed to communitarian,
conceptions of the good. Indeed, most conceptions of the good contain both individual and commu-
nal elements. Nothing in liberalism rules out conceptions of the good that specify a form of life for a
community of voluntary association. Such a conception of the good could include strong commu-
nity, i.e., a form of association that is constituitive of the identities and ends of its members. The
liberal conception of the right does however, rule out, at least as forms of life, those conceptions of
the good that require either coercive state power or official state endorsement. Cf. M. SANDEL,
supra note 4, at 147-54. In opposition to Sandel, I contend that the liberal requirement that commu-
nities of ends be voluntary does not entail that they must be chosen in a sense that is inconsistent
(Vol. 66:93
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deals with only a subset of the good. In particular the right defines the
limits that justice or fairness imposes on our pursuit of the good.41
The distinction between the right and the good is the basis for an
important qualification of my claim that Aristotle's theory is in some
ways inconsistent with the fact of pluralism. The qualification can be
expressed abstractly: an Aristotelian conception of the good is not incon-
sistent with the fact of pluralism, except insofar as it becomes incorpo-
rated in an Aristotelian conception of the right. The qualification can be
expressed another way: it is Aristotle's political theory and not his ethical
theory that is inconsistent with the fact of pluralism.
Indeed, I am very attracted to Aristotle's moral theory. Of course,
some parts of his moral theory would be ruled out by a liberal theory of
justice. Aristotle was a sexist and a racist.42 Nevertheless, I am in agree-
ment with Beiner about the attractiveness of Aristotle's naturalistic con-
ception of the good as human flourishing-faring well and doing well. I
also agree with Beiner about the value of Aristotle's emphasis on the
development of character. Aristotle's theory of the virtues is an impor-
tant counter to the tendency of some liberal moral theories (utilitarian-
ism, Kantian ethics) to emphasize moral rules.
My disagreement with Beiner takes two forms. First, I disagree
with the claim that Aristotle's ethical theory accepts and incorporates the
radical pluralism about the nature of the good that characterizes moder-
nity. Second, I disagree with the notion that Aristotle's political theory
could provide a stable social order without repressive state coercion,
given the fact of pluralism.
Consider first Beiner's claim that Aristotle's moral theory is not mo-
nistic-that it recognizes and allows for pluralism in a way that will sat-
isfy liberal critics of Aristotle. Many of Beiner's specific points are on the
mark. He is correct in observing that Aristotle recognized the existence
of a variety of conceptions of the good.43 Moreover, his contention that
with their being constituitive. Membership in a constituitive community can be "voluntary" in the
sense required by liberalism so long as it is not coerced. Moreover, membership can in a constitui-
tive community can be voluntary even though it is not perceived as chosen by its members. Thus,
someone who is Amish may see their Amishness as constituitive of their identity and thus not "cho-
sen" in Sandel's sense. Yet, at the same time, participation in the Amish way of life is voluntary, in
that it is not the product of state coercion or endorsement.
41. These limits are not deduced, however, from the nature of the person. The priority of the
right over the good is the result of a principled political choice. There is no metaphysical guarantee
of this priority. From within our separate conceptions of the good, we-choose to affirm a conception
of justice that limits our right to pursue the good because this is a good thing, given the fact of
pluralism.
42. See Solum, Virtues and Voices. supra note 8, at 127-28.
43. See Beiner, supra note 6, at 75-76.
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Aristotle acknowledges the consistency of more than one plan of life with
the greatest good, with happiness, is plausible. There are, however,
passages in Aristotle that seem inconsistent with this interpretation. An-
other plausible reading of Aristotle is that he sees the life of a philoso-
pher as the only truly good life and a life in politics as the only
meaningful alternative. 44 But the question should not be what Aristotle
himself thought; we ought to ask whether Beiner can develop a version of
Aristotle's moral theory that retains its power and also accounts for the
fact of pluralism.
Recall that the fact of pluralism is not simply that people differ in
their choices of occupations or hobbies. The pluralism at issue is the
radical disagreement about the good that characterizes modernity. Con-
sider a variation on Beiner's example of the middle class violinist and the
missionary priest.45 I may believe that playing the violin is a worthy
activity that gives my life its central meaning, and you may believe that
my devoting my life to music is frivolous, vain, and sinful. You may
even believe that you have a moral duty to attempt to bring me to see the
error of my ways.46 Beiner says that you and I are hunting the same fox,
eudaimonia, and that we are merely off after different scents-I am rid-
ing through the woods, you are galloping by the brook.47
Beiner's metaphor fails to do justice to the substantive content of
Aristotle's theory. Aristotle did not limit himself to the formal claim
that the label "happiness" should be applied to the point for which we
ultimately aim, although Aristotle did start with that claim.48 Aristotle's
full theory includes the further and substantive claim that there is a par-
ticular point at which we ought to aim. That point is eudaimonia, faring
well and doing well, or flourishing. Aristotle's full account of
eudaimonia is more than merely formal; it is substantive, rich and tex-
tured. Aristotle gives a naturalistic account on which happiness requires
living a successful and prosperous life, perhaps a political life or a philo-
sophical life. In other words, Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia, when
understood in light of his whole theory, is sufficiently thick 49 that we can
44. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICS Bks. I & X; J.O. URMSON, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 118-26 (1988);
W.F.R. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY 12-27 (2d ed. 1980).
45. See Beiner, supra note 6, at 80.
46. This example raises a more general point. Beiner is, I believe, correct in contending that
Aristotle's moral theory is consistent with a diversity of human goods: you play the violin, and I do
missionary work. But liberalism addresses the problem of inconsistent, other-regarding conceptions
of the good: you play the violin, and I try to save your soul by stopping you.
47. See Beiner, supra note 6, at 76.
48. Aristotle does make a point like this in the Nicomachean Ethics, but that is the beginning
and not the end of his argument. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. I.
49. See B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 129 (1985) (distinguishing
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confidently say that, given the fact of pluralism, a society whose ethos
attempted to habituate its citizens to aim only at this point would have
grave problems.
This point can be expressed with a variation of Aristotle's own met-
aphor. Aristotle compared the citizens of the polis to the sailors on a
ship.50 Each member of the crew has a different function. The pilot aims
to be excellent at navigation and command, whereas the cook strives to
be excellent at cooking. But every member of the crew shares the com-
mon goal of arriving at the destination safely. From time to time, there
may even be disagreement among the crew as to what the destination is,
but such disagreements must be resolved if the ship is to function well. A
diversity of individual functions and opinions in the polis is consistent
with a unity of purpose or common telos for the city as a whole. But a
modem liberal state is more like a busy harbor than a single vessel.
Communities of voluntary association may join together for a voyage
united by a common vision of the good life. Individuals may strike out on
their own. There is still common ground; all who sail may agree upon
the rules of navigation. But this agreement takes place within a context
of pluralism; different vessels have different destinations.
I am not accusing Aristotle of "failing to perceive moral conflict." 5'
Rather, my point is that the sort of moral conflict for which Aristotle's
theory accounts, moral conflict within the "moral space" or ethos of
Greek city states, is radically different from the conflict that character-
izes the moral space of modernity. The Greeks, despite their real and
significant moral disagreements, seem to agree on quite a lot if their ethi-
cal life is contrasted with ours. Aristotle's political theory accounts for
the facts of classical life; liberalism is a political theory for modernity.
This leads me to my second point: Aristotle's political theory is not
consistent with the fact of pluralism. His conception of the polis is not
designed to account for radical disagreement about the nature of the
good life. For example, Aristotle believed that the state should inculcate
virtue in the citizenry. Aristotle could acknowledge that there may be
disagreements at the margins about the precise nature of virtue. Indeed,
ethical concepts which are "thicker," or "more specific" such as treachery, promise, brutality, and
courage); RAwLs, supra note 17, at 396 (positing a "thin" theory of the good, "restricted to the bare
essentials"). Aristotle's theory of happiness or eudaimonia is thick because it incorporates his ac-
count of the human excellences or virtues, such as courage, and the virtues themselves are thick
concepts. Some argue that his theory is thick for another reason-that Aristotle assumes that one
sort of life, a philosophical life, is the only life that is truly worth living. My point does not depend
on this further argument. On the question whether Aristotle has a limited picture of the good life,
see the sources cited in note 44 supra.
50. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 7, at 1276 b20.
51. Beiner, supra note 6, at 76-77.
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his theory is certainly consistent with even more substantial disagree-
ments about the best method of education. But Aristotle's theory does
not account for modernity. At least since the Renaissance, some have
seen virtue as faith, hope, humility, and charity, while others have con-
ceived of virtue as courage, prudence, and nobility.
Let me be clear: I am not now claiming that the fact of pluralism is a
good thing, although it may be. Rather, my claim is that given the fact
of pluralism, those who adhere to any comprehensive moral or political
view, be it Aristotelian or Evangelical, cannot realistically expect that
any democratic society in the late twentieth century could adopt their
comprehensive moral or religious doctrine as the foundation for an ethos.
This is a practical truth, based on the realities of modern culture, and not
a truth of a priori moral theory.
To summarize: (1) Aristotle's moral theory offers an attractive con-
ception of the good; (2) his full moral theory does not provide a strongly
pluralist conception of the good, because it includes thick substantive
notions of what constitutes a good life; (3) with proper qualifications,
Aristotle's moral theory, as a conception of the good, could flourish as
one ideal among many in a liberal society; but (4) Aristotle's political
theory, insofar as it incorporates his moral theory as a specification of the
end or telos of the polis as a whole, is inconsistent with the fact of
pluralism.
III. MODERNITY AND THE LIBERAL REGIME
My second point is to deny that liberalism has an impoverished
ethos.52 In particular, I disagree with an implicit premise in the thesis
that liberalism should be blamed for the ills of late twentieth century
capitalism. This thesis equates liberalism with American capitalism, and
attributes the ills of the latter to the former: "there is a distinctive liberal
way of life: a way of life characterized by the aspiration to increase and
enhance the prerogatives of the individual ...a way of life based on
progress, growth, and technological dynamism."'53
There is an ambiguity in the use of the terms "liberal" and "liber-
alism" that I want to explore. Liberalism can refer to a political theory
or to an ideology. On the one hand, liberalism is a family of political
theories-of theoretical reflection about the desirable forms of social or-
ganization. Even so understood, the term liberalism remains ambiguous
because of the wide variety of liberal political theories. When I discuss
52. See id. at 83.
53. Id.
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liberalism in this first sense, I refer to a particular strand of liberal
thought. The liberal political theory that I defend is rooted in the
thought of John Locke54 and exemplified by the ongoing work of John
Rawls55 and others.5 6
There is a second sense in which the term liberalism can be used.
Liberalism could be taken to refer to the dominant ideology 5 7 of western
political culture. In this sense, liberalism refers to the political discourse
that is characteristic of capitalist societies. The distinction between the
two senses of liberalism is important, because according to some liberal
political theories western culture is far from living up to liberal ideals.
Beiner's critique is primarily aimed at liberal ideology rather than at
liberal political theory.58 Moreover, it seems to me that even as a criti-
cism of liberal ideology, Beiner has made some enormous (and unsub-
stantiated) assumptions about the relationship between liberal ideology
and the impoverishment of culture in the late twentieth century. How
can liberal ideology be blamed for 'the world-wide proliferation of
McDonalds?5 9
Beiner's critique of liberalism is based on his notion that because
liberalism is a regime, it must endorse a set of ends. Therefore, liberalism
can be held to account for its ethos, for the way in which it habituates
citizens. Liberal ideology, therefore, is responsible for the characters of
citizens in liberal societies. °
I must confess that I am somewhat confused about the nature of
Beiner's claim. Consider an idealist and Hegelian interpretation of what
he says. Hegel believed that the dialectic of ideas was the engine of social
54. See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1988); 6 J. LOCKE, THE
WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 1-574 (1823) (containing A Letter Concerning Toleration, A Second Letter
Concerning Toleration A Third Letter for Toleration, and A Fourth Letter for Toleration).
55. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 38; Rawls, The Domain of the Political
and Overlapping Consensus, supra note 26; Rawls, The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good,
supra note 38; Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensu& supra note 17; Rawls, Justice as Fair-
ness" Political not Metaphysical, supra note 18; Address by John Rawls, The Idea of Free Public
Reason, Inaugural Abraham Melden Lectures, Department of Philosophy, University of California
at Irvine (February 27 & March 1, 1990); J. Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Briefer Restatement
(1989) (unpublished manuscript); see also C. KUKATHAS & P. PETIT, RAWLs (1990).
56. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); C. LARMORE,
PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in 11 THE
TANkER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (1990); Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
MORALITY (S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
57. See R. BOUDIN, THE ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY (M. Slater trans. 1989); J. THOMPSON,
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1984).
58. Beiner's argument, which points to the cultural impoverishment of contemporary America,
could not be directed at a liberal political theory, the ideals of which have not yet been satisfied by
American institutions. Thus, for example, it could not be directed at Rawls's theory.
59. See Beiner, supra note 6, at 84.
60. Id. at 84.
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change; he was an idealist. 61 If idealism were the correct and fundamen-
tal explanation of history, then it would be natural to assume that liberal
ideology is responsible for the consumerism and materialism that mark
capitalist culture. The difficulty is that Hegelian idealism is radically im-
plausible as a theory of social change. Liberal ideology does not explain
the rise of capitalism. We should not, therefore, assume that Beiner in-
tends to endorse Hegelian idealism.
Suppose that Beiner does not intend to rely on idealism when he
claims that liberalism is responsible for the ills of American culture. His
claim could then be interpreted in two ways. Beiner might be claiming
that liberal ideology causes cultural impoverishment (the causation
claim), or he might be claiming that liberalism is a symptom, that the
forces which cause cultural impoverishment also give rise to liberal ideol-
ogy (the symptom claim).
Consider the first possibility, that liberalism causes cultural impov-
erishment. The nature of this claim is still ambiguous. There are at least
two possible causal relationships between liberalism and modem culture.
First, as a historical matter, the introduction of liberal ideology may have
started a causal sequence which gave rise to the specific features of mod-
em culture which Beiner abhors. Call this the etiological version. Some
of Beiner's remarks could be read to suggest the etiological version. For
example, he observes the tendency of the liberal way of life "to turn all
areas of human activity into matters of consumer preference." 62
The difficulty is that the etiological version of the causation claim
seems implausible. One difficulty is the lack of causal mechanisms or
microfoundations63 for the thesis that liberal ideology causes material-
ism. It may be true that citizens in liberal societies are consumerist and
lack virtue. It may also be true that "[t]he great majority of individuals
in any society are simply socialized to given roles." 64 But how did the
introduction of liberal ideology cause the patterns of socialization that
characterize modem capitalism? This same question could be asked
about the relationship between Aristotle's moral and political theory and
his society. Greek sexism and racism should not casually or easily be
attributed to the causal influence of Greek political and ethical thought.
The lack of microfoundations for the claim that liberal ideology is
61. For a sympathetic account of Hegel's theory of history, see S. SMrrH, HEGEL'S CRITIQUE
OF LIBERALISM 194-231 (1989). I do not claim that the text which accompanies and follows this
note presents a full or adequate treatment of Hegel's views.
62. Beiner, supra note 6, at 83 (emphasis added).
63. See J. ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 5-8 (1985); Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisi&"
Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 462, 486 (1987).
64. Beiner, supra note 6, at 85.
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the cause of the cultural impoverishment of modernity can be contrasted
with more plausible accounts of the etiology of the cultural and moral ills
of modernity. For example, we might want to consider the possibility
that the impoverished values of consumerism result, not from liberal ide-
ology, but from what Habermas calls the colonization of the "lifeworld"
by the system-the subjugation of ever greater portions of human life to
the steering mechanisms of the market economy and institutionalized bu-
reaucratic power.65 To put it another way, it seems more plausible to
assume that capitalism caused liberal ideology, than to assume that lib-
eral ideology caused capitalism."6
The etiological version of the causation claim does not offer the only
account of a causal relationship between liberal ideology and the ills of
modern culture. Even if these features were initially caused by other fac-
tors, the retention of liberal ideology may be efficacious in reinforcing
these features or preventing their elimination. Call this the reinforcement
version of the causation claim. This version of a causation claim is more
plausible than the etiological version. The notion that ideologies operate
to reinforce existing social arrangements is familiar from Marxism and
the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Some of Beiner's remarks
could be read as endorsing the reinforcement version: "the liberal social
and political order offers an ideology of pluralism... to mask its organi-
zation of social life according to a distinct and overarching vision of com-
munal life."' 67 Or "the rhetoric of liberalism serves to squelch a concrete
examination of social practices that would validate or invalidate the
claim of wondrous diversity [in liberal society]. ' 68
Thus, the reinforcement version of the causation claim might rest on
the further claim that liberalism is ideology "in the pejorative sense," 69
that members of liberal societies are deluded about their true interests
and the real conditions of social life. But what delusion does liberal ide-
ology foster with respect to the fact of pluralism? Beiner's answer must
be that the appearance of radical disagreement about the nature of the
good is all smoke and mirrors-that if we made citizens aware of the
nature of their true interests, religious and moral disagreement would
65. See J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (T. McCarthy trans. 1984
& 1987) (two volumes); see also D. RASSMUSSEN, READING HABERMAS 45-54 (1989); S. WHITE,
THE RECENT WORK OF JORGEN HABERMAS 107-23 (1988); Solum, Freedom of Communicative
Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 54, 104-05 (1988-
89).
66. Of course, these are complex questions. See generally J. ELSTER, supra note 63, at 459-5 10.
67. Beiner, supra note 6, at 85.
68. Id. at 91.
69. R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY 12 (1981).
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dissolve. But pluralism is a fact and not a delusion. It may be that
Beiner does not agree, that he believes that liberalism rests on a "phony
pluralism." 70 If so, then the disagreement between Beiner and myself is
in part an empirical one.
Finally, Beiner may not be making the claim that liberal ideology
causes the ills of modem culture at all. It is possible that he sees liber-
alism as a symptom of cultural fragmentation and not its cause, ie., that
he espouses what I call the symptom claim. In a sense, I agree with this
claim. As I see it, both liberal ideology and liberal political theory are
responses to the fact of pluralism. But that does not imply that liber-
alism is to blame for the fact of pluralism or its negative consequences for
modem culture. If Beiner believes the liberal ideology is the symptom,
then his critique should not be directed at liberalism. Rather Beiner
ought to focus on the underlying forces that cause the social conditions
of which he complains.
Finally, Beiner levies a criticism that is clearly directed at liberal
political theory rather than liberal ideology. He argues that political
judgments must be made about the ordering of ends in whole societies.
He contends that liberal political theory puts significant questions off-
limits-that liberals can only make judgments about the state and not
about civil society.
The "state/society dichotomy," which Beiner contends places "in-
tolerable constraints on the exercise of political judgment 7 1 may be a
feature of some forms of liberal political theory. For example, certain
libertarian strands of liberal political theory have a robust conception of
the private realm that removes almost all of private economic activity
from the political agenda. But this is not true of the best version of liber-
alism. To put the point in Rawlsian terms, the system of economic or-
ganization is part of the basic structure. 72 To put it more colloquially,
liberals have for the past several decades been complaining loudly about
private power. Indeed, they have complained so loudly that the ideology
of laissez faire no longer counts as liberal in contemporary political
discourse.
A point similar to Beiner's is on the mark: liberal political theory
removes some questions from the social agenda. In a liberal society, the
state cannot force individuals to choose any particular conception of the
good life, nor can the state endorse any comprehensive religious or philo-
70. Beiner, supra note 6, at 90-91.
71. Id. at 90.
72. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 7 (positing that economic institutions
are part of the basic structure, subject to constraints of a liberal theory of justice).
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sophical doctrine, be it Aristotelian or Kantian, Catholic or Protestant,
secular or religious. Beiner is right to say that this aspect of liberalism is
not neutral. Liberalism does not give every conception of the good an
equal chance of gaining adherents. Conceptions of the good which re-
quire injustice are ruled out altogether, at least as ways of life. Other
conceptions of the good will not flourish, perhaps because they require
state reinforcement in order to gain adherents, or perhaps because they
cannot survive in a pluralistic society.
What grounds are there for believing that liberal political philoso-
phy rule out forms of life that are both filled with meaning and consistent
with justice? Consider one possibility. It might be that the fact of plural-
ism rules out certain forms of social change. It could be postulated that
unity of social purpose, basic agreement about what constitutes a good
life, is a prerequisite for the emancipation of the oppressed and powerless
or the enrichment of modern culture. The only way to counter con-
sumerism and materialism, the argument might continue, is through so-
cial agreement on some particular ideal of human association. The
conclusion would be that pluralism is inconsistent with desirable social
transformation.
I am not persuaded, however, that liberalism as a political theory
requires an atomistic or materialistic conception of the good. This is not
to say that an illiberal society couldn't stamp out materialism; perhaps it
could. But Beiner's argument requires him to make the stronger claim
that a liberal society could not support a pluralism in which materialist
consumerism did not dominate public culture. To put it another way,
Beiner must demonstrate that there is no possible world in which both
(a) liberal political theory is satisfied and (b) public culture is not domi-
nated by atomistic and materialist conceptions of the good.73 Liberal
political theories cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of actual socie-
ties that espouse liberal ideologies. The evaluation of any political theory
requires an act of imagination-a vision of the possible political worlds
that the theory opens up. The observation that in our society liberal ide-
ology coexists with materialism and cultural impoverishment does not
demonstrate that liberal political theories necessarily will engender such
ills.
73. To be more precise, the requirement is for a demonstration that there is no historically and
nomologically accessible possible world in which these conditions are satisfied. Historically and
nomologically accessible possible worlds share the history of the actual world through the present
and are subject to the same causal laws. See generally D. LEWIs, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS
(1986).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Liberalism acknowledges a tragic fact of modem life. Given the fact
of pluralism, we cannot have a public culture that will satisfy any one
conception of the good life. The ideal of human association that I would
endorse, if the fact of pluralism did not hold, might well be a more egali-
tarian version of Aristotle'spolis. It would be a community whose mem-
bers shared a concept of the good life that included active political
involvement and serious reflection. But it would be a secular community
and not a sacred one. It would be an intellectual community and not a
materialistic one. Given the fact of pluralism, I would be naive to think
that a modem polity will reach consensus on my vision of the good life.
What I can hope for is more modest. I can hope for a tolerant commu-
nity. I can hope for a community in which everyone has a reasonable
chance to flourish and prosper. I can hope for justice.
